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As is well known, Italy is undergoing an institutional crisis sparked by President Mattarella’s
veto on the composition of the prospective Italian government. The apparent cause of the
crisis is the choice of Paolo Savona as Minister of the Economy. From a constitutional
perspective, several considerations may be made. Diletta Tega and Michele Massa have
already published a balanced and informative entry in this blog. We find their legal
arguments persuasive, although we lean to the view that there is a disproportion between
the proclaimed ends and the chosen means. It would have been more fitting, as has been
argued, that the Head of State would have accepted the new government while exerting an
special vigilance over the potential conflicts between the policies being implemented and
the Italian Constitution, along the lines of Article 74 of the Italian Constitution (for a more
elaborate version of the argument, see here). In this entry, we approach the issue from yet
another perspective. Our goal is to set the “Savona affaire” in its broader EU context. In
many ways, this episode is revealing of the democratic limits of the European constitutional
architecture and institutional culture. Following Dieter Grimm, we claim that the events here
analysed reveal the extent to which the EU legal framework is overconstitutionalised and
the democratic costs and risks inherent in this legal and political order.
Can an economist critical of the current governance of the Euro be appointed as Minister of
Finance of a Eurozone country? Simply put, this is the issue at stake in the “Savona
affaire”. It is by now well known that Paolo Savona, an experienced economist and policy-
maker who was already a member of the pro-European Ciampi government back in the
1990s, has recently grown into an outspoken critic of the current state of the Eurozone.
Notably, in a series of articles and public speeches, Savona has claimed that the Union
should complete the Eurozone with all the instruments required to manage an non-optimal
currency area (see for example, here). Yet, having realized that a majority of European
governments are likely to oppose a similar reform agenda, he also warned against the
economic and social risks inherent in remaining for indefinite time in the current “no man’s
land” in which the euro remains a currency without a state. Thus, he aired the idea that Italy
should at any rate devise a “plan B” aimed at exiting the Eurozone were his EU partners to
maintain their opposition. (In another contribution, he suggested instead that Germany and
Northern Europe countries should leave the Euro).
It seems to us this is not the profile of a dangerous politician aiming destroying the existing
institutional structures and decision-making processes, but rather one of a federalist without
illusions. Clearly, Mattarella harboured a different view, and that explains how he reacted.
Still, the boldness of Mattarella’s intervention is surprising given not only his profile both as
life-time moderate politician and constitutional judge, but also as a rather self-contained
President. Hitherto, he had acted on the basis of a self-understanding of his role rather
different from the interventionist style of Giorgio Napolitano, not infrequently regarded as
having given the Presidency an imprint closer to the head of states with a direct popular
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mandate.
Why Mattarella rejected Savona
In rejecting Savona, Mattarella issued a declaration the examination of which may be very
instructive in the assessment of the constraints imposed by EU membership on the
operation of national constitutional democracies.
Firstly, Mattarella claims that an Italian Minister of the Economy cannot be the “supporter of
a [political] line, repeatedly manifested, that could provoke, even inevitably, the Italian’s exit
from the Euro”. In shorter and perhaps clearer terms, Ministers of the Economy have to be
a safe pair of hands, and those who dare to express doubts concerning the irreversibility of
the euro are by definition not a safe pair of hands. The fact that Savona had been a minister
in no other than the Ciampi government is besides the point. His very public entertainment
of doubts regarding the pertinence of drawing exit plans from the Eurozone to strengthen
the negotiating hand of Italian officials disqualifies him, given that the very act of his
appointment could increase the cost of borrowing for the Italian Treasury (the infamous
spread), thus compromising — and we quote literally — the savings of Italians: “The losses
on the stock exchange, day after day, burn resources and savings of our companies and
those who have invested. And they constitute real risks for the savings of our fellow citizens
and for Italian families”. Thus, it seems to have been the case that what triggered a rather
unprecedented decision in its consequences, was not the  identity or the record of the
Minister of Finances in pectore, but his policy views, i.e. his allegedly being sceptic of the
irreversibility of monetary union.
Secondly, Mattarella did not raise any concern regarding the rather controversial (and
constitutionally problematic) migration and asylum policies enshrined in the “contratto di
governo” (including the expulsion of 500,000 irregular immigrants and the dismantlement of
Roma camps). He did not even feel the need to oppose the appointment to Minister of the
Interior of Matteo Salvini, whose conduct in the recent past included gross sexist offences
to the former President of the Camera dei Deputati Laura Boldrini. Serious doubts regarding
the national constitutionality and European validity of the intended policies could be raised,
but in this regard the President did not make proof of the same level of constitutional
militancy when it came to different issues.
Thirdly, President Mattarella has clearly sensed that his decision to block Savona could
raise eyebrows. This emerges at the end of his declaration where he qualifies the
arguments previously expressed to justify his rejection: “The decision of joining the Euro is
of key importance for the prospects of our Country and of our youth: if we want to discuss
it, we have to do so openly and after a serious in-depth analysis. Also because it is an issue
that was not brought up during our recent election campaign”. This passage clearly softens
what otherwise would have been a harsh foreclosure of political debate. According to
Mattarella, exit plans from the Eurozone can in principle be pursued, but only after open
democratic deliberation which did not take place before the last general elections. But for
the time being (presumably, within this legislative term) that policy option is not up for grabs
and will meet his resistance.
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EU law does not require Euro-loyalist ministers
Can Matterella’s action be constructed as a correct interpretation of EU norms? Does EU
law require Ministers of the Economy to refrain from criticizing the existing Eurozone
arrangements or from voicing doubts regarding the continued membership of Eurozone
states? First of all, let’s state it clearly: European law does not impose any policy
requirement for Minister of the Economy sitting in the ECOFIN and the Eurogroup.  Only
European Commissioners are expected to be committed Europeans (article 17(3) TEU),
but apparently this did not prevent the like of Ralph Dahrendorf – a well known critic of the
Eurocurrency – to take office in the past.
It is true that Member States of the Eurozone are under an obligation of loyalty towards
each other and towards the European Union as a whole. But “federal loyalty” does not, and
cannot, entail loyalty to present policies. Furthermore, it would be silly to construct loyalty
as requiring putting a lid on potential reform processes. Otherwise, the number of Ministers
of Finance who would have been forced to resign would be legion. Starting with the
Ministers that were keen to raise the possibility of Greece being forced to exit the Eurozone
if Greek governments did not accept certain conditions or implemented certain policies.
Such statements may or may not have been politically wise, but certainly they were legally
permissible.
It could still be said that being a Member State of the European Union, and especially of the
Eurozone, requires not only putting in common the exercise of some powers, but also
making a serious effort at constructing national norms, including constitutional norms, in
such a way as to reduce the potential of conflict with supranational norms (in vertical
terms), and with the constitutional laws of other states (in horizontal terms). But it would be
deeply wrong to conclude that integration requires setting aside the fundamental values
and principles enshrined in each national constitution, and perhaps even less so the
principles at the core of the common democratic constitutional traditions of the Member
States. So far, the Movimento Cinque Stelle and Lega have come to the conclusion that the
policies needed to achieve to a great extent the goals prescribed by the Italian Constitution
require policies that are impossible to apply under the present European economic
“governance”. Savona has been reiterating this point for years. To put it in other terms, the
new government is making a claim that in legal terms comes close to that made by Dieter
Grimm when he has observed that European law, as interpreted by the European Court of
Justice and, we would add, as practiced in the context of the European economic
government, ties with the golden fetters of the euro the hands of national governments,
rendering hopeless the task of removing the obstacles to the realization of substantive
equality, as required by the Italian (and other) constitutions.
A renovated form of "pactum ad excludendum"
It seems to us that Mattarella’s decision only starts to make sense if one adds a
fundamental piece to the constitutional equation, namely a form of “convention”
(functionally equivalent to a constitutional convention) according to which political parties or
coalitions that are critical of the existing economic and monetary arrangements within the
Eurozone cannot get into government. Or, more accurately, they are entitled to govern in a
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tamed form (the other precedent in this regard is the taming of the Tsipras government,
where also an unwelcome Minister of Finance ended up being ostracized). Another direct
(but failed) precedent to initiate that convention can be found in the actions taken by the
former President of Portugal to prevent the present ruling coalition in Portugal to come into
power. Such a convention could be said to be a renovated form of “pactum ad
excludendum”, only this time it would not be the communists, but those daring to be critical
of European economic govermment arrangements that would have to be prevented from
holding power.
There are three reasons why we find it extremely problematic to assume that such a
convention is part and parcel of European law. Firstly, the convention has massive
constitutional implications, amounting to a radical undermining of national and European
constitutional law. Given that such convention not only lacks any form of democratic
legitimacy, but amounts to a decisive limit to the existing procedures of democratic will-
formation, we see every reason to contest its bindingness. Secondly, the convention is
intended to foster the formation of governments that are either clearly minoritarian or that
rely for their legitimacy on technocratic claims. Distant and recent precedents of such forms
of lasting circumvention of responsive democratic government are far from encouraging.
Thirdly, making national governments safe for the irreversibility of the euro might buy some
time for the present economic and monetary union, but only at the price of further
accelerating the accrual of conditions that favour the emergence of extremely radical policy
proposals that would throw not only the dirty water of a deeply malfunctioning economic
and monetary union, but also the baby of the Democratic and Social Rechtsstaat. In the
present case, it is far from improbable that were new elections to be held, the result would
be massive political, economic and social turbulence, out of which all kinds of political
monsters could emerge. We should have by now learnt some lessons from European
history.
The Eurozone crises are symptoms of deep underlying social, cultural and political
malaises. A massive social fracture is emerging, out of which results not so much a conflict
between the Europhiles and the Eurosceptics, but a new social question that opposes the
happy and smart few to the increasingly restless and powerless many, as Alexander
Somek has reminded us. The very same fire burning at the dark core of growing social
inequality feeds the peculiar belief in a new form of authoritarian liberalism, in which the
preservation of monetary and financial stability trumps democracy. But Member States, and
Italy among them, are not a liberal republic founded on the preservation of the store value
of money, but a democratic republic founded on labour that should aim at removing the
obstacles not to free movement of capital, but to the actual equality of its citizens. Had
Mattarella clinged fast to such values, not only Italy would have by now a government, but
perhaps he would have contributed to rekindle the languishing hopes that the Eurozone
can still be reformed, and saved from a collapse that those who proclaim to be their
advocates are objectively favouring with their actions. The Eurozone does not need yet
another constitutional convention tightening the straitjacket it has become, but on the
contrary, the recreation of political space by deconstitutionalising a good number of the rigid
norms at its core, as Dieter Grimm has proposed.
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